mas, mbok diterjemahke..
:D
--- In psikologi_transformatif@yahoogroups.com, Hudoyo Hupudio
<hudoyo@...> wrote:
>
> [Artikel ini saya ambil dari situs terkenal dan terhormat tentang
Buddhisme Tibet: The Berzin Archives,
>
http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/advanced/kalachakra/relation_islam_hinduism/holy_wars_buddhism_islam/holy_war_buddhism_islam_shambhala_long.html
> Ringkasan & Kesimpulannya saya terjemahkan./hudoyo]
>
> HOLY WARS IN BUDDHISM AND ISLAM:
> THE MYTH OF SHAMBHALA
>
> (Full Version)
>
> Alexander Berzin
> November 2001, revised December 2006
>
> RINGKASAN
>
> Sering kali, ketika orang berpikir tentang konsep jihad atau perang
suci Muslim, mereka menghubungkannya dengan konotasi negatif tentang
suatu peperangan yang berdasarkan rasa-benar-sendiri, yang
menghancurkan demi balas dendam atas nama Tuhan untuk memaksa orang
masuk agama sendiri. Mereka mungkin mengakui bahwa Kristen pun
mempunyai padanan hal itu dengan Perang-Perang Salib mereka, tetapi
biasanya tidak melihat ada yang mirip seperti itu dalam Buddhisme.
Bagaimana pun juga, kata mereka, Buddhisme adalah agama damai dan
tidak punya istilah teknis mengenai 'perang jihad'.
>
> Namun, suatu penelitian yang mendalam tentang kitab-kitab suci
Buddhis, khususnya literatur Kalachakra Tantra, mengungkapkan adanya
pertempuran di tingkat eksternal dan internal yang dengan mudah dapat
disebut "perang jihad". Suatu penelitian tanpa-bias tentang Islam juga
mengungkapkan hal yang sama. Dalam kedua agama itu, para pemimpinnya
dapat memanfaatkan dimensi-dimensi eksternal dari perang jihad untuk
keuntungan politis, ekonomis, atau pribadi, dengan menggunakannya
untuk mengobarkan semangat pasukan mereka dalam pertempuran.
Contoh-contoh historis dalam hal Islam cukup dikenal, tetapi hendaknya
kita jangan silau tentang Buddhisme dan mengira agama itu bebas dari
fenomena ini. Namun, dalam kedua agama itu, tekanan pokoknya adalah
pada pertempuran spiritual di-dalam melawan kegelapan batin kita
sendiri dan tindak-tanduk kita yang destruktif.
>
> [Summary
>
> Often, when people think of the Muslim concept of jihad or holy war,
they associate with it the negative connotation of a self-righteous
campaign of vengeful destruction in the name of God to convert others
by force. They may acknowledge that Christianity had an equivalent
with the Crusades, but do not usually view Buddhism as having anything
similar. After all, they say, Buddhism is a religion of peace and does
not have the technical term holy war.
>
> A careful examination of the Buddhist texts, however, particularly
The Kalachakra Tantra literature, reveals both external and internal
levels of battle that could easily be called "holy wars." An unbiased
study of Islam reveals the same. In both religions, leaders may
exploit the external dimensions of holy war for political, economic,
or personal gain, by using it to rouse their troops to battle.
Historical examples regarding Islam are well known; but one must not
be rosy-eyed about Buddhism and think that it has been immune to this
phenomenon. Nevertheless, in both religions, the main emphasis is on
the internal spiritual battle against one's own ignorance and
destructive ways.]
>
> Analysis
>
> Military Imagery in Buddhism
>
> Shakyamuni Buddha was born into the Indian warrior caste and often
used military imagery to describe the spiritual journey. He was the
Triumphant One, who defeated the demonic forces (mara) of unawareness,
distorted views, disturbing emotions, and impulsive karmic behavior.
The eighth-century CE Indian Buddhist master Shantideva employs the
metaphor of war repeatedly throughout Engaging in Bodhisattva
Behavior: the real enemies to defeat are the disturbing emotions and
attitudes that lie hidden in the mind. The Tibetans translate the
Sanskrit term arhat, a liberated being, as foe-destroyer, someone who
has destroyed the inner foes. From these examples, it would appear
that in Buddhism, the call for a "holy war" is purely an internal
spiritual matter. The Kalachakra Tantra, however, reveals an
additional external dimension.
>
> The Legend of Shambhala
>
> According to tradition, Buddha taught The Kalachakra Tantra in
Andhra, South India, in 880 BCE, to the visiting King of Shambhala,
Suchandra, and his entourage. King Suchandra brought the teachings
back to his northern land, where they have flourished ever since.
Shambhala is a human realm, not a Buddhist pure land, where all
conditions are conducive for Kalachakra practice. Although an actual
location on earth may represent it, His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai
Lama explains that Shambhala exists purely as a spiritual realm.
Despite the traditional literature describing the physical journey
there, the only way to reach it is by intense Kalachakra meditation
practice.
>
> Seven generations of kings after Suchandra, in 176 BCE, King
Manjushri Yashas gathered the religious leaders of Shambhala,
specifically the brahman wise men, to give them predictions and a
warning. Eight hundred years in the future, namely in 624 CE, a
non-Indic religion will arise in Mecca. Because of a lack of unity
among the brahmans' people and laxity in following correctly the
injunctions of their Vedic scriptures, many will accept this religion,
far in the future, when its leaders threaten an invasion. To prevent
this danger, Manjushri Yashas united the people of Shambhala into a
single "vajra-caste" by conferring upon them the Kalachakra
empowerment. By his act, the king became the First Kalki the First
Holder of the Caste. He then composed The Abridged Kalachakra Tantra,
which is the version of The Kalachakra Tantra that is presently extant.
>
> The Non-Indic Invaders
>
> As the founding of Islam dates from in 622 CE, two years before
Kalachakra's predicted date, most scholars identify the non-Indic
religion with that faith. Descriptions of the religion elsewhere in
the Kalachakra texts as having the slaughter of cattle while reciting
the name of its god, circumcision, veiled women, and prayer five times
a day facing its holy land reinforce their conclusion.
>
> The Sanskrit term for non-Indic here is mleccha (Tib. lalo), meaning
someone who speaks incomprehensibly in a non-Sanskrit tongue. Hindus
and Buddhists alike have applied it to all foreign invaders of North
India, starting with the Macedonians and Greeks at the time of
Alexander the Great. The other major Sanskrit term used is tayi, which
derives from the Persian term for Arabs, used, for instance, in
reference to the Arab invaders of Iran in the mid-seventh century CE.
>
> The First Kalki further described the future non-Indic religion as
having a line of eight great teachers: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses,
Jesus, Mani, Muhammad, and Mahdi. Muhammad will come to Baghdad in the
land of Mecca. This passage helps to identify the invaders within the
Islamic community.
>
> Muhammad lived between 570 and 632 CE in Arabia. Baghdad, however,
was built only in 762 CE as the capital of the Arab Abbasid Caliphate
(750 1258 CE).
>
> Mani was a third-century Persian who founded an eclectic religion,
Manichaeism, which like the earlier Iranian religion Zoroastrianism,
emphasized a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Within
Islam, he would have been accepted perhaps as a prophet although it
is not clear that he ever was only by the heretical Manichaean
Islamic sect found among some officials in the early Abbasid court in
Baghdad. The Abbasid caliphs severely persecuted its followers.
>
> Buddhist scholars from present-day Afghanistan and the Indian
subcontinent worked in Baghdad during the latter part of the eighth
century CE, translating Sanskrit texts into Arabic.
>
> Mahdi will be a future ruler (imam), descendent from Muhammad, who
will lead the faithful to Jerusalem, restore Quranic law and order,
and unite the followers of Islam in a single political state before
the apocalypse that ends the world. He is the Islamic equivalent of a
messiah. The concept of Mahdi became prominent only during the early
Abbasid period, with three claimants to the title: a caliph, a rival
in Mecca, and a martyr, in whose name an anti-Abbasid rebellion was
led. The full concept of Mahdi as a messiah, however, did not appear
until the end of the ninth century CE.
>
> The Ismaili Shia list of the prophets is the same as that found in
Kalachakra, only minus Mani. The Ismailis are the only Islamic sect
that asserts Mahdi as a prophet.
>
> Ismaili Shia was the official sect of Islam followed in Multan
(present-day northern Sindh, Pakistan) during the second half of the
tenth century. Multan was an ally of the Ismaili Fatimid Empire
centered in Egypt and challenging the Abbasids for supremacy over the
Islamic world.
>
> From this evidence, we may postulate that the Kalachakra description
of the non-Indic invaders was based on the Ismailis of Multan in the
late tenth century CE, mixed with some aspects of the Manichaean
Muslims of the late eighth century. The compilers of this description
would most likely have been Buddhist masters living under Hindu Shahi
rule in eastern Afghanistan and Oddiyana (Swat Valley, present-day
northwestern Pakistan). Buddhist monasteries in the Kabul region of
Afghanistan, such as Subahar, had architectural motifs similar to
those in the Kalachakra mandala. Oddiyana was one of the main regions
in which Buddhist tantra developed. Moreover, Oddiyana had close
contact with Kashmir, where both Buddhist and Hindu Shaivite tantra
flourished. A major Buddhist pilgrimage route connected the two. Thus,
we must look to Buddhist-Muslim relations in eastern Afghanistan,
Oddiyana, and Kashmir during the Abbasid period to understand the
context of its teachings on history and holy wars.
>
> [For further detail, see: The Kalachakra Presentation of the
Prophets of the Non-Indic Invaders: Full Analysis.]
>
> The Prophesy of an Apocalyptic War
>
> The First Kalki predicted that the followers of the non-Indic
religion will some day rule India. From their capital in Delhi, their
king Krinmati will attempt the conquest of Shambhala in 2424 CE. The
commentaries suggest that Krinmati will be recognized as the messiah
Mahdi. The Twenty-fifth Kalki, Raudrachakrin, will then invade India
and defeat the non-Indics in a great war. His victory will mark the
end of the kaliyuga "the age of disputes," during which Dharma
practice will degenerate. Afterwards, a new golden age will follow
during which the teachings will flourish, especially those of Kalachakra.
>
> The idea of a war between the forces of good and evil, ending with
an apocalyptic battle led by a messiah, first appeared in
Zoroastrianism, founded in the sixth century BCE, several decades
before Buddha was born. It entered Judaism some time between the
second century BCE and the second century CE. Subsequently, it made
its way into early Christianity and Manichaeism, and later into Islam.
>
> A variation of the apocalyptic theme also appeared in Hinduism, in
The Vishnu Purana, dated approximately the fourth century CE. It
relates that at the end of the kaliyuga, Vishnu will appear in his
final incarnation as Kalki, taking birth in the village of Shambhala
as the son of the brahman Vishnu Yashas. He will defeat the non-Indics
of the time who follow a path of destruction and will reawaken the
minds of the people. Afterwards, in keeping with the Indian concept of
cyclical time, a new golden age will follow, rather than a final
judgment and the end of the world as in the non-Indic versions of the
theme. It is difficult to establish whether The Vishnu Purana account
derived from foreign influences and was adapted to the Indian
mentality, or arose independently.
>
> In keeping with Buddha's skillful means of teaching with terms and
concepts familiar to his audience, The Kalachakra Tantra also uses the
names and images from The Vishnu Purana. Its stated audience, after
all, was primarily educated brahmans. The names not only include
Shambhala, Kalki, the kaliyuga, and a variant of Vishnu Yashas,
Manjushri Yashas, but also the same term mleccha for the non-Indics
bent on destruction. In the Kalachakra version, however, the war has a
symbolic meaning.
>
> The Symbolic Meaning of the War
>
> In The Abridged Kalachakra Tantra, Manjushri Yashas explains that
the fight with the non-Indic people of Mecca is not an actual war,
since the real battle is within the body. The fifteenth-century CE
Gelug commentator Kaydrubjey elaborates that Manjushri Yashas's words
do not suggest an actual campaign to kill the followers of the
non-Indic religion. The First Kalki's intention in describing the
details of the war was to provide a metaphor for the inner battle of
deep blissful awareness of voidness against unawareness and
destructive behavior.
>
> Manjushri Yashas clearly enumerates the hidden symbolism.
Raudrachakrin represents the " mind-vajra," namely the clear light
subtlest mind. Shambhala represents the state of great bliss in which
the mind-vajra abides. Being a Kalki means that mind-vajra has the
perfect level of deep awareness, namely simultaneously arising
voidness and bliss. Raudrachakrin's two generals, Rudra and Hanuman,
stand for the two supporting kinds of deep awareness, that of the
pratyekabuddhas and of the shravakas. The twelve Hindu gods who help
win the war represent the cessation of the twelve links of dependent
arising and of the twelve daily shifts of the karmic breaths. The
links and the shifts both describe the mechanism perpetuating samsara.
The four divisions of Raudrachakrin's army represent the purest levels
of the four immeasurable attitudes of love, compassion, joy, and equality.
>
> The non-Indic forces that Raudrachakrin and the divisions of his
army defeat represent the minds of negative karmic forces. Muhammad
represents the pathway of destructive behavior. The horse on which
Mahdi rides symbolizes unawareness of behavioral cause and effect and
of voidness. Mahdi's four army divisions stand for hatred, malice,
resentment, and prejudice, the exact opposites of the Shambhala armed
forces. Raudrachakrin's victory represents the attainment of the path
to liberation and enlightenment.
>
> The Buddhist Didactic Method
>
> Despite textual disclaimers of calling for an actual holy war, the
implication here that Islam is a cruel religion, characterized by
hatred, malice, and destructive behavior, can easily be used as
evidence to support that Buddhism is anti-Muslim. Although some
Buddhists of the past may in fact have had this bias and some
Buddhists of today may likewise hold a sectarian view, one may also
draw a different conclusion in light of one of the Mahayana Buddhist
didactic methods.
>
> For example, Mahayana texts present certain views as characterizing
Hinayana Buddhism, such as selfishly working for one's liberation
alone, without regard for helping others. After all, the stated goal
of Hinayana practitioners is self-liberation, not enlightenment for
the sake of benefiting everyone. Although such description of Hinayana
has led to prejudice, an educated objective study of Hinayana schools,
such as Theravada, reveals a prominent role of meditation on love and
compassion. One might conclude that Mahayana was simply ignorant of
the actual Hinayana teachings. Alternatively, one might recognize that
Mahayana is using here the method in Buddhist logic of taking
positions to their absurd conclusions in order to help people avoid
extremist views. The intention of this prasangika method is to caution
practitioners to avoid the extreme of selfishness.
>
> The same analysis applies to the Mahayana presentations of the six
schools of medieval Hindu and Jain philosophies. It also applies to
each of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions' presentations of the views of
each other and the views of the native Tibetan Bon tradition. None of
these presentations gives an accurate depiction. Each exaggerates and
distorts certain features of the others to illustrate various points.
The same is true of the Kalachakra assertions about the cruelty of
Islam and its potential threat. Although Buddhist teachers may claim
that the prasangika method here of using Islam to illustrate spiritual
danger is a skillful means, one might also argue that it is grossly
lacking in diplomacy, especially in modern times.
>
> The use of Islam to represent destructive threatening forces,
however, is understandable when examined in the context of the early
Abbasid period in the Kabul region of eastern Afghanistan.
>
> [As background for this discussion, see: Historical Sketch of
Buddhism and Islam in Afghanistan. See also: The Historical
Interaction between the Buddhist and Islamic Cultures before the
Mongol Empire, Part III, Chapter 10.]
>
> Buddhist-Islamic Relations during the Abbasid Period
>
> At the start of the period, the Abbasids ruled Bactria (northern
Afghanistan), where they allowed the local Buddhists, Hindus, and
Zoroastrians to keep their religions if they paid a poll tax. Many,
however, voluntarily accepted Islam, especially among the landowners
and the educated upper urban classes. Its high culture was more
accessible than their own and they could avoid paying the heavy tax.
The Turki Shahis, allied with the Tibetans, ruled Kabul, where
Buddhism and Hinduism were flourishing. The Buddhist rulers and
spiritual leaders might easily have worried that a similar phenomenon,
conversion out of convenience, would happen there.
>
> The Turki Shahis ruled the region until 870 CE, losing control of it
only between 815 and 819. During those four years, the Abbasid Caliph
al-Mamun invaded Kabul and forced the ruling shah to submit to him and
accept Islam. To represent his submission, the Kabul Shah presented
the Caliph, as a gift, a gold Buddha statue from Subahar Monastery. As
a sign of the triumph of Islam, Caliph al-Mamun sent the enormous
statue, with its silver throne and jeweled crown, to Mecca and
displayed it there at the Kaaba for two years. In doing so, the caliph
was demonstrating his authority to rule the entire Islamic world after
vanquishing his brother in a civil war. He did not force all the
Buddhists of Kabul to convert, however, nor did he destroy the
monasteries. He did not even smash, as an idol, the Buddha statue that
the Kabul Shah had presented him, but sent it instead to Mecca as
booty. After the Abbasid army withdrew to fight against movements for
autonomy in other parts of their empire, the Buddhist monasteries
quickly recovered.
>
> The next period in which the Kabul region came under Islamic rule
was also short, between 870 and 879 CE. It was conquered by the
Saffarad rulers of an autonomous military state, remembered for its
harshness and destruction of local cultures. The conquerors sent many
Buddhist "idols" back as war trophies to the Abbasid caliph. When the
successors to the Turki Shahis, the Hindu Shahis, retook the region,
Buddhism and the monasteries once more recovered their previous splendor.
>
> The Turkic Ghaznavids conquered eastern Afghanistan from the Hindu
Shahis in 976 CE, but did not destroy the Buddhist monasteries there.
As vassals of the Abbasids, the Ghaznavids too were strict followers
of Sunni Islam. Although they tolerated Buddhism and Hinduism in
eastern Afghanistan, their second ruler, Mahmud of Ghazni, launched a
campaign against the Abbasid rivals, the Ismaili state of Multan.
Mahmud conquered Multan in 1008 CE, driving the Hindu Shahis from
Gandhara and Oddiyana on the way. The Hindu Shahis had allied
themselves with Multan. Wherever he conquered, Mahmud looted the
wealth from the Hindu temples and Buddhist monasteries, and
consolidated his power.
>
> After this victory in Multan, and driven undoubtedly by greed for
more land and wealth, Mahmud pressed his invasion further eastward. He
conquered the present-day Indian Punjab, known in those days as
"Delhi." However, when the Ghaznavid troops pushed northward from
Delhi to the foothills of Kashmir, chasing after the remnants of the
Hindu Shahis in 1015 or 1021, depending on the sources one uses, they
were defeated, purportedly by the use of mantras. This was the first
attack on Kashmir attempted by a Muslim army. The Kalachakra
description of the future invasion and defeat of the non-Indic forces
in Delhi is most likely, then, a conflation of the Multanese threat to
the Abbasids and Ghaznavids with the Ghaznavid threat to Kashmir.
>
> Correlation between the Predictions and History
>
> The First Kalki's historical predictions, then, clearly fit the
above times, but mold the events to illustrate lessons. However, as
the thirteenth-century CE Sakya commentator Buton remarks about the
Kalachakra presentation of history, "To scrutinize historical events
of the past is meaningless." Nevertheless, Kaydrubjey explains that
the predicted war between Shambhala and the non-Indic forces is not
merely a metaphor without reference to a future historical reality. If
that were so, then when The Kalachakra Tantra applies internal
analogies for the planets and constellations, the absurd conclusion
would follow that the heavenly bodies exist only as metaphors and have
no external reference.
>
> Kaydrubjey also cautions, however, against taking literally the
additional Kalachakra prediction that the non-Indic religion will
eventually spread to all twelve continents and Raudrachakrin's
teachings will overcome it there too. The prediction does not concern
the specific non-Indic people described earlier, or their religious
beliefs or practices. The name mleccha here merely refers to
non-Dharmic forces and beliefs that contradict Buddha's teachings.
>
> Thus, the prediction is that destructive forces inimical to
spiritual practice and not specifically a Muslim army will attack
in the future, and an external "holy war" against them will be
necessary. The implicit message is that, if peaceful methods fail and
one must fight a holy war, the struggle must always base itself on the
Buddhist principles of compassion and deep awareness of reality. This
is true despite the fact that in practice this guideline is extremely
difficult to follow when training soldiers who are not bodhisattvas.
Nevertheless, if the war is driven by the non-Indic principles of
hatred, malice, resentment, and prejudice, future generations will see
no difference between the ways of their ancestors and those of the
non-Indic forces. Consequently, they will easily adopt the non-Indic ways.
>
> The Islamic Concept of Jihad
>
> Is one of the invader ways the Islamic concept of jihad? If so, is
Kalachakra accurately describing jihad, or is it using the non-Indic
invasion of Shambhala merely to represent an extreme to avoid? To
avert interfaith misunderstanding, it is important to investigate
these questions.
>
> The Arabic word jihad means a struggle in which one needs to endure
suffering and difficulties, such as hunger and thirst during Ramadan,
the holy month of fasting. Those who engage in this struggle are
mujahedin. One is reminded of the Buddhist teachings on patience for
bodhisattvas to endure the difficulties of following the path to
enlightenment.
>
> The Sunni division of Islam outlines five types of jihad:
>
> A military jihad is a defensive campaign against aggressors trying
to harm Islam. It is not an offensive attack to convert others to
Islam by force.
>
> A jihad by resources entails giving financial and material support
to the poor and needy.
>
> A jihad by work is honestly supporting oneself and one's family.
>
> A jihad by study is to acquire knowledge.
>
> A jihad against oneself is an internal struggle to overcome wishes
and thoughts counter to the Muslim teachings.
>
> The Shia divisions of Islam emphasize the first type of jihad,
equating an attack on an Islamic state with an attack on the Islamic
faith. Many Shiites also accept the fifth type, the internal spiritual
jihad.
>
> Similarities between Buddhism and Islam
>
> The Kalachakra presentation of the mythical Shambhala war and the
Islamic discussion of jihad show remarkable similarities. Both
Buddhist and Islamic holy wars are defensive tactics for stopping
attacks by external hostile forces, and never offensive campaigns for
winning converts. Both have internal spiritual levels of meaning, in
which the battle is against negative thoughts and destructive
emotions. Both need to be waged based on ethical principles, not on
the basis of prejudice and hatred. Thus, in presenting the non-Indic
invasion of Shambhala as purely negative, the Kalachakra literature is
in fact misrepresenting the concept of jihad in the prasangika manner
of taking it to its logical extreme to illustrate a position to avoid.
>
> Moreover, just as many leaders have distorted and exploited the
concept of jihad for power and gain, the same has occurred with
Shambhala and its discussion of war against destructive foreign
forces. Agvan Dorjiev, the late nineteenth-century CE Russian Buryat
Mongol assistant tutor of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, proclaimed that
Russia was Shambhala and the Czar was a Kalki. In this way, he tried
to convince the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to align with Russia against the
"mleccha" British in the struggle for control of Central Asia.
>
> The Mongols have traditionally identified both King Suchandra of
Shambhala and Chinggis Khan as incarnations of Vajrapani. Fighting for
Shambhala, then, is fighting for the glory of Chinggis Khan and for
Mongolia. Thus, Sukhe Batur leader of the 1921 Mongolian Communist
Revolution against the extremely harsh rule of the White Russian and
Japanese-backed Baron von Ungern-Sternberg inspired his troops with
the Kalachakra account of the war to end the kaliyuga. He promised
them rebirth as warriors of the King of Shambhala, despite there being
no textual foundation for his claim in the Kalachakra literature.
During the Japanese occupation of Inner Mongolia in the 1930s, the
Japanese overlords, in turn, tried to gain Mongol allegiance and
military support through a propaganda campaign that Japan was Shambhala.
>
> [See: Exploitation of the Shambala Myth for Control of Mongolia.]
>
> Kesimpulan
>
> Persis seperti para pengritik Buddhisme bisa memfokuskan pada
penyalahgunaan tingkat pertempuran eksternal dari Kitab Kalachakra
sambil mengesampingkan tingkat internalnya, sehingga sikap ini tidak
adil terhadap Buddhisme secara keseluruhan; begitu pula mengenai para
pengritik jihad yang anti-Muslim. Nasehat dalam kitab-kitab tantra
Buddhis mengenai guru spiritual mungkin bermanfaat di sini. Hampir
setiap guru spiritual mempunyai campuran antara sifat-sifat baik dan
kesalahan. Sekalipun seorang siswa tidak seharusnya mengingkari
sifat-sifat negatif seorang guru, memikirkannya terus-menerus hanya
akan menghasilkan amarah dan depresi. Sebaliknya, jika siswa
memusatkan pada sifat-sifat positif seorang guru, ia akan memperoleh
inspirasi untuk mengikuti jalan spiritual.
>
> Hal yang sama dapat dikatakan tentang ajaran Buddhis dan Islam
tentang perang suci. Kedua agama itu telah mengalami penyalahgunaan
dari seruannya untuk bertempur secara lahiriah bila ada kekuatan
destruktif yang mengancam praktik keagamaan. Tanpa mengingkari atau
memikirkan terus-menerus penyalahgunaan-penyalahgunaan ini, kita bisa
memperoleh inspirasi dengan memusatkan pada manfaat dari melancarkan
perang suci batiniah dalam masing-masing kepercayaan itu.
>
> [Conclusion
>
> Just as critics of Buddhism could focus on abuses of Kalachakra's
external level of spiritual battle and dismiss the internal level, and
this would be unfair to Buddhism as a whole; the same is true
regarding anti-Muslim critics of jihad. The advice in the Buddhist
tantras regarding the spiritual teacher may be useful here. Almost
every spiritual teacher has a mixture of good qualities and faults.
Although a disciple must not deny the negative qualities of a teacher,
to dwell on them will only cause anger and depression. If, instead, a
disciple focuses on a teacher's positive qualities, he or she will
gain inspiration to follow the spiritual path.
>
> The same can be said about the Buddhist and Islamic teachings
regarding holy wars. Both religions have seen abuses of its calls for
an external battle when destructive forces threaten religious
practice. Without denying or dwelling on these abuses, one can gain
inspiration by focusing on the benefits of waging an inner holy war in
either creed.]
>
